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THE LOGBARRIER ADVERSARIAL ATTACK: MAKING EFFECTIVE USE OF DECISION
BOUNDARY INFORMATION
CHRIS FINLAY1, ARAM-ALEXANDRE POOLADIAN1, AND ADAM M. OBERMAN1,2
ABSTRACT. Adversarial attacks for image classification are small perturbations to images that are designed to
cause misclassification by a model. Adversarial attacks formally correspond to an optimization problem: find a
minimum norm image perturbation, constrained to cause misclassification. A number of effective attacks have
been developed. However, to date, no gradient-based attacks have used best practices from the optimization
literature to solve this constrained minimization problem. We design a new untargeted attack, based on these best
practices, using the well-regarded logarithmic barrier method.
On average, our attack distance is similar or better than all state-of-the-art attacks on benchmark datasets
(MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet-1K). In addition, our method performs significantly better on the most challenging
images, those which normally require larger perturbations for misclassification. We employ the LogBarrier attack
on several adversarially defended models, and show that it adversarially perturbs all images more efficiently than
other attacks: the distance needed to perturb all images is significantly smaller with the LogBarrier attack than
with other state-of-the-art attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have achieved impressive results in many areas of application. However, deep
learning models remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks [SZS+13]: small changes (imperceptible to the
human eye) in the model input may lead to vastly different model predictions. In security-based applications,
this vulnerability is of utmost concern. For example, traffic signs may be modified with small stickers to
cause misclassification, causing say a stop sign to be treated as speed limit sign [EEF+18]. Facial recognition
systems can be easily spoofed using colourful glasses [SBBR16].
This security flaw has led to an arms race in the research community, between those who develop defences
to adversarial attacks, and those working to overcome these defences with stronger adversarial attack methods
[WK18, RSL18]. Notably, as the community develops stronger adversarial attack methods, claims of model
robustness to adversarial attack are often proved to be premature [CW17, ACW18].
There are two approaches to demonstrating a model is resistant to adversarial attacks. The first is theo-
retical, via a provable lower bound on the minimum adversarial distance necessary to cause misclassification
[WK18, RSL18, KBD+17]. Theoretical lower bounds are often pessimistic: the gap between the theoretical
lower bound and adversarial examples generated by state-of-the-art attack algorithms can be large. Therefore,
a second empirical approach is also used: an upper bound on the minimum adversarial distance is demon-
strated through adversarial examples created by adversarial attacks [KGB16, MMS+17, CW17, BRB18].
The motivation to design strong adversarial attacks is therefore twofold: on the one hand, to validate theo-
retical lower bounds on robustness; and on the other, to construct empirical upper bounds on the minimum
adversarial distance. Ideally, the gap between the theoretical lower bound and the empirical upper bound
should be small. As adversarial attacks become stronger, the gap narrows from above.
The process of finding an adversarial example with an adversarial attack is an optimization problem: find
a small perturbation of the model input which causes misclassification. This optimization problem has been
1 DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS, MCGILL UNIVERSITY
2 AIFASTER CONSULTING INC
E-mail address: christopher.finlay@gmail.com, aram-alexandre.pooladian@mail.mcgill.ca,
adam.oberman@mcgill.ca.
Date: March 26, 2019.
AO supported by AFOSR grant FA9550-18-1-0167.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
10
39
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
5 M
ar 
20
19
2 THE LOGBARRIER ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
recast in various ways. Rather than directly enforcing misclassification, many adversarial attacks instead
attempt to maximize the loss function. The Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) was one of the first
adversarial attacks to do so [SZS+13], measuring perturbation size in the `∞ norm. Iterative versions of
FGSM were soon developed, where perturbations were measured in either the `∞ and `2 norms [KGB16,
MMS+17, ZCR18]. These iterative methods perform Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), maximizing the
loss function subject to a constraint enforcing small perturbation in the appropriate norm. Other works have
studied sparse adversarial attacks, as in [PMJ+16]. Rather than maximizing the loss, Carlini and Wagner
[CW17] developed a strong adversarial attack by forcing misclassification to a predetermined target class. If
only the decision of the model is available (but not the loss or the model gradients), adversarial examples can
still be found using gradient-free optimization techniques [BRB18].
In this paper, rather than using the loss as a proxy for misclassification, we design an adversarial attack that
solves the adversarial optimization problem directly: minimize the size of the input perturbation subject to a
misclassification constraint. Our method is gradient-based, but does not use the training loss function. The
method is based on a sound, well-developed optimization technique, namely the logarithmic barrier method
[NW06]. The logarithmic barrier is a simple and intuitive method designed specifically to enforce inequality
constraints, which we leverage to enforce misclassification. We compare the LogBarrier attack against cur-
rent benchmark adversarial attacks (using the Foolbox attack library [RBB17]), on several common datasets
(MNIST [LC], CIFAR10 [Kri09], ImageNet-1K [DDS+09]) and models. On average, we show that the
LogBarrier attack is comparable to current state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. Moreover, we show that on
challenging images (those that require larger perturbations for misclassification), the LogBarrier attack con-
sistently outperforms other adversarial attacks. Indeed, we illustrate this point by attacking models trained to
be adversarially robust, and show that the LogBarrier attack perturbs all images more efficiently than other
attack methods: the LogBarrier attack is able to perturb all images using a much smaller perturbation size
than that of other methods.
2. BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Adversarial examples arise in classification problems across multiple domains. The literature to date has
been concerned primarily with adversarial examples in image classification: adversarial images appears no
different (or only slightly so) from an image correctly classified by a model, but despite this similarity, are
misclassified.
We let X be the space of images. Typically, pixel values are scaled to be between 0 and 1, so that X is the
unit box [0, 1]M ⊂ RM . We let Y be the space of labels. If the images can be one of N classes, Y is usually
a subset of RN . Often Y is the probability simplex, but not always. In this case, each element yi of a label y
correspond to the probability an image is of class i. Ground-truth labels are then one-hot vectors.
A trained model, with fixed model weights w, is a map f(·;w) : X → Y . For brevity, in what follows
we drop dependence on w. For an input image x, the model’s predicted classification is the arg max of the
model outputs. Given image-label pair (x, y), let c be the index of the correct label (the arg max of y). A
model is correct if arg max f(x) = c.
An adversarial image is a perturbation of the original image, x+ δ, such that the model misclassifies:
(1) arg max f(x+ δ) 6= c
The perturbation must be small in a certain sense: it must be small enough that a human can still correctly
classify the perturbed image. There are various metrics for measuring the size of the perturbation. A common
choice is the `∞ norm (the max-norm); others use the (Euclidean) `2 norm. If perturbations must be sparse
– for example, if the attacker can only modify a small portion of the total image – then the count of non-
zero elements in δ may be used. Throughout this paper we let m(δ) be a generic metric on the size of the
perturbation δ. Typically m(δ) is a specific `p norm, m(δ) = ‖δ‖p, such as the Euclidean or max norms.
Thus the problem of finding an adversarial image may be cast as an optimization problem, minimize the size
of the perturbation subject to model misclassification.
The misclassification constraint is difficult to enforce, so a popular alternative is to introduce a loss func-
tion L. For example, L could be the loss function used during model training. In this case the loss measures
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the ‘correctness’ of the model at an image x. If the loss is large at a perturbed image x + δ, then it is hoped
that the image is also misclassified. The loss function is then used as a proxy for misclassification, which
gives rise to the following indirect method for finding adversarial examples:
(2)
maximize
δ
L(x+ δ)
subject to m(δ) ≤ ε,
maximize the loss subject to perturbations being smaller than a certain threshold. The optimization approach
taken by (2) is by far the most popular method for finding adversarial examples. In one of the first papers on
this topic, Szegedy et al [SZS+13] proposed the Fast Signed Gradient Method (FGSM), wherem(δ) is the `∞
norm of the perturbation δ, and the solution to (2) is approximated by taking one step in the signed gradient
direction. An iterative version with multiple steps, Iterative FGSM (IFGSM) was proposed in [KGB16], and
remains the method of choice for adversarial attacks measured in `∞. When perturbations are measured in
`2, (2) is solved with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [MMS+17].
Fewer works have studied the adversarial optimization problem directly, i.e., without a loss function. In
a seminal work, Carlini and Wagner [CW17], developed a targeted attack, in which the adversarial distance
is minimized subject to a targeted misclassification. In a targeted attack, not just any misclassification will
do: the adversarial perturbation must induce misclassification to a pre-specified target class. The Carlini-
Wagner attack (CW) incorporates the targeted misclassification constraint as a penalty term into the objective
function. The CW attack was able to overcome many adversarial defence methods that had been thought to
be effective, and was an impetus for the adversarial research community’s search for rigorous, theoretical
guarantees of adversarial robustness.
There is interest in gradient-free methods for finding adversarial examples. In this scenario, the attacker
only has access to the classification of the model, but not the model itself (nor the model’s gradients). In
[BRB18], Brendal et al directly minimize the `2 adversarial distance while enforcing misclassification using
a gradient-free method. Their Boundary attack iteratively alternates between minimizing the perturbation
size, and projecting the perturbation onto the classification boundary. The projection step is approximated by
locally sampling the model decision near the classification boundary.
3. THE LOGBARRIER ATTACK
We tackle the problem of finding (untargeted) adversarial examples by directly solving the following
optimization problem,
(3)
minimize
δ
m(δ)
subject to arg max f(x+ δ) 6= c,
that is, minimize the adversarial distance subject to misclassification. We use the logarithmic barrier method
[NW06] to enforce misclassification, as follows. We are given an image-label pair (x, y) and correct label
c = arg max y. Misclassification at an image x occurs if there is at least one index of the model’s prediction
with greater value than the prediction of the correct index:
(4) max
i6=c
fi(x)− fc(x) > 0
This is a necessary and sufficient condition for misclassification. Thus, we rewrite (3):
(5)
minimize
δ
m(δ)
subject to max
i6=c
fi(x+ δ)− fc(x+ δ) > 0.
The barrier method is a standard tool in optimization for solving problems such as (5) with inequality con-
straints. A complete discussion of the method can be found in [NW06]. In the barrier method, inequality
constraints are incorporated into the objective function via a penalty term, which is infinite if a constraint
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FIGURE 1. The logarithmic barrier function φ(·) := −λ log(·) defined over (0, 1). As λ
decreases, the barrier becomes steeper, mimicking a hard constraint.
is violated. If a constraint is far from being active, then the penalty term should be small. The negative
logarithm is an ideal choice:
(6) min
δ
m(δ)− λ log (fmax − fc)
where we denote fmax := maxi fi(x + δ) and fc := fc(x + δ). If the gap between fmax is much larger
than fc, the logarithmic barrier term is small. However, as this gap shrinks, the penalty term approaches
infinity. Thus the penalty acts as a barrier, forcing an optimization algorithm to search for solutions where the
constraint is inactive. If (6) is solved iteratively with smaller and smaller values of λ, in the limit as λ → 0,
the solution to the original problem (5) is recovered. (This argument can be made formal if desired, using
Γ-convergence [Bra02].) See Figure 1, where the barrier function is plotted with decreasing values of λ. In
the limit as λ→ 0, the barrier becomes 0 if the constraint is satisfied, and∞ otherwise.
3.1. Algorithm description. We now give a precise description of our implementation of the log barrier
method for generating adversarial images. The constraint fmax − fc > 0 can be viewed as a feasible set.
Thus, the algorithm begins by finding an initial feasible image: the original image must be perturbed so
that it is misclassified (not necessarily close to the original). There are several ways to find a misclassified
image. A simple approach would be to take another natural image with a different label. However, we have
found in practice that closer initial images are generated by randomly perturbing the original image with
increasing levels of noise (e.g. Standard Normal or Bernoulli) until it is misclassified. After each random
perturbation, the image is projected back onto the set of images in the [0, 1]M box, via the projection P .
This process is briefly described in Algorithm 1. Note that if the original image is already misclassified, no
random perturbation is performed, since the original image is already adversarial.
After an initial perturbation is found, we solve (6) for a fixed λ. Various optimization methods algorithms
may be used to solve (6). For small- to medium-scale problems, variants of Newton’s method are typically
preferred. However, due to computational constraints, we chose to use gradient descent. After each gradient
descent step, we check to ensure that the updated adversarial image remains in the [0, 1]M box. If not, it is
projected back into the set of images with the projection P .
It is possible that a gradient descent step moves the adversarial image so that the image is correctly clas-
sified by the model. If this occurs, we simply backtrack along the line between the current iterate and the
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Algorithm 1 LogBarrier: Initialization
Input: image x ∈ X , model f(·;w), ρ, step-size h > 0, kmax ∈ N.
Initialize: B ∼ Bernoulli(ρ) ∈ X or B ∼ Normal(0, 1)
for k = 0 to kmax do
if x misclassified then
Exit for-loop
else
Sample b from B
x← P(x+ h1.01kb)
end if
end for
FIGURE 2. The central path taken by the LogBarrier attack. Dashed lines represent level
sets of the logarithmic barrier function. As λ decreases iterates approach the decision
boundary.
previous iterate, until we regain feasibility. To illustrate the backtracking procedure, let u(k) be the pre-
vious iterate, and u˜(k+1) be a candidate adversarial image which is now correctly classified. We continue
backtracking the next iterate via
(7) u˜(k+1) ← γu˜(k+1) + (1− γ)u(k),
until the iterate is misclassified. The hyper-parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is a backtracking parameter. The accu-
mulation point of the above sequence is u(k). As a result, this process is guaranteed to terminate, since the
previous iterate is itself misclassified. This backtracking procedure is sometimes necessary when iterates are
very close to the decision boundary. If the iterate is very close to the decision boundary, then the gradient
of the log barrier term is very large, and dominates the update step. Since the constraint set fmax − fy > 0
is not necessarily convex or even fully connected, it is possible that the iterate could be sent far from the
previous iterate without maintaining misclassification. We rarely experience this phenomenon in practice,
but include the backtracking step as a safety. An alternate approach (which we did not implement), more
aligned with traditional optimization techniques, would be instead to use a dynamic step size rule such as the
Armijo-Goldstein condition [Arm66].
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Algorithm 2 LogBarrier attack
Input: original image x, initial misclassified image u(0), model f(·;w), distance measure m(·)
Hyperparameters: backtrack factor γ ∈ (0, 1); initial penalty size λ0; step size h; λ shrink factor β ∈
(0, 1); termination threshold ε > 0; and maximum iterations Kouter, Jinner ∈ N.
for k = 0 toKouter do
λk = λ0β
k
for j = 0 to Jinner do
u˜(j+1) ← u(j) − h∇
(
m(u(j) − x) + λkφ(u(j))
)
u(j+1) ← P
(
u˜(j+1)
)
project onto [0, 1]M
while u(j+1) not misclassified do
u(j+1) ← γu(j+1) + (1− γ)u(j)
end while
if ‖u(j+1) − u(j)‖ ≤ ε then
break
end if
end for
end for
The gradient descent algorithm comprises a series of iterates in an inner loop. Recall that as λ → 0, the
log barrier problem approaches the original problem (5). Thus, we shrink λ by a certain factor and repeat the
procedure again, iterating in a series of outer loops (of course, initializing now with previous iterate). As λ
shrinks, the solutions to (6) approach the decision boundary. In each inner loop, if the iterates fail to move
less than some threshold value ε, we move onto the next outer loop. The path taken by the iterates of the
outer loop is called the central path, illustrated in Figure 2.
The LogBarrier attack pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 2. For brevity we write the log barrier
φ(u) := − log(maxi fi(u) − fc(u)). We remark that the LogBarrier attack can be improved by running the
method several times, with different random initializations (although we do not implement this here).
The literature on adversarial perturbations primarily focuses on perturbations measured in the `2 and `∞
norms. For perturbations measured in the `2 norm, we set the distance measure to be the squared Euclidean
norm, m(δ) = ‖δ‖22. When perturbations are measured in the `∞ norm, we do not use the max-norm directly
as a measure, due to the fact that the `∞ norm is non-smooth with sparse subgradients. Instead, we use the
following approximation of the `∞ norm [LZH+14],
‖δ‖∞ = max
i=1,...,N
|δi|
≈
∑N
i=1 |δi| exp(α|δi|)∑N
i=1 exp(α|δi|)
,
where α > 0. As α→∞ the `∞ norm is recovered.
Algorithm hyper-parameters. Like many optimization routines, the logarithmic barrier method has several
hyper-parameters. However, because our implementation is parallelized, we have found that the tuning pro-
cess is relatively quick. For the `∞ attack, our default parameters are ε = 10−6, h = 0.1, β = 0.75, γ =
0.5, λ0 = 0.1,Kouter = 25, and Jinner = 1000. For `2, we set h = 5 · 10−3 with Kouter = 15 and Jinner = 200;
the rest are the same as in the `∞ case.
For the initialization procedure, we have kmax = 103 and h = 5 · 10−4. If attacking in `2, we initialize
using the Standard Normal distribution. Else, for `∞, we use the Bernoulli initialization with ρ = 0.01.
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TABLE 1. Percent misclassification of the networks at a specified perturbation size, for
attacks measured in `2. Because we are measuring the strength of adversarial attacks, at a
given adversarial distance, a higher percentage misclassified is better.
MNIST CIFAR10 Imagenet-1KAllCNN ResNeXt34
‖δ‖2 2.3 120/255 120/255 1
LogBarrier 99.10 98.70 99.90 98.40
CW 98.50 97.30 90.40 74.86
PGD 52.58 86.60 59.80 90.00
BA 97.20 98.70 99.60 48.80
TABLE 2. Percent misclassification of the networks at a specified perturbation size, for
attacks measured in `∞. Higher percentage misclassified is better.
MNIST CIFAR10 Imagenet-1KAllCNN ResNeXt34
‖δ‖∞ 0.3 8/255 8/255 8/255
LogBarrier 94.80 100 98.70 95.20
IFGSM 73.40 93.1 75.80 99.60
Top5 misclassification. The LogBarrier attack may be generalized to enforce Top5 misclassification as well.
In this case, the misclassification constraint is that f(k)(x+ δ)−fc(x+ δ) > 0, k = 1, . . . , 5, where now (k)
is the index of sorted model outputs. (In other words, f(1) = maxi fi, and f(2) is the second-largest model
output, and so forth.) We then set the barrier function to be −∑5k=1 log(f(k) − fc). In this scenario, the
LogBarrier attack is initialized with an image that is not classified in the Top5.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We compare the LogBarrier attack with current state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on three benchmark
datasets: MNIST [LC], CIFAR10 [Kri09], and ImageNet-1K [DDS+09]. On MNIST and CIFAR10, we
attack 1000 randomly chosen images; on ImageNet-1K we attack 500 randomly selected images, due to
computational constraints. On ImageNet-1K, we use the Top5 version of the LogBarrier attack.
All other attack methods are implemented using the adversarial attack library Foolbox [RBB17]. For ad-
versarial attacks measured in `2, we compare the LogBarrier attack against Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
[MMS+17], the Carlini-Wagner attack (CW) [CW17], and the Boundary attack (BA) [BRB18]. These three
attacks all very strong, and consistently perform well in adversarial attack competitions. When measured in
`∞, we compare against IFGSM [KGB16], the current state-of-the-art. We leave Foolbox hyper-parameters
to their defaults, except the number of iterations in the Boundary attack, which we set to a maximum of 5000
iterations.
4.1. Undefended networks. We first study the LogBarrier attack on networks that have not been trained to
be adversarially robust. For MNIST, we use the network described in [CW17, PMJ+16]. On CIFAR10, we
consider two networks: AllCNN [SDBR14], a shallow convolutional network; and a ResNeXt34 (2x32)
[XGD+17], a much deeper network residual network. Finally, for ImageNet-1K, we use a pre-trained
ResNet50 [HZRS16] available for download on the PyTorch website.
Tables 1 and 2 report the percentage misclassified, for each attack at a fixed perturbation size. A strong
attack should have a high misclassification rate. In the tables, the perturbation size is chosen to agree with
attack thresholds commonly reported in the adversarial literature. Measured in Euclidean norm, we see that
the LogBarrier attack is the strongest on all datasets and models. Measured in the max-norm, the LogBarrier
outperforms IFGSM on all datasets and models, except on ImageNet-1K where the difference is slight.
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TABLE 3. Adversarial attacks perturbation statistics in the `2 norm. We report the mean
and variance of the adversarial distance on a subsample of the test dataset. Lower values
are better.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet-1KAllCNN ResNeXt34
µ σ2 µ σ2 µ σ2 µ σ2
LogBarrier 1.29 1.98e−1 1.63e−1 1.12e−2 1.21e−1 6.68e−3 3.82e−1 6.87e−2
CW 1.27 1.96e−1 1.72e−1 8.57e−2 2.39e−1 1.87e−1 8.86e−1 1.59
PGD 2.54 2.53 3.18e−1 3.49e−1 6.88e−1 1.15 4.21e−1 3.16e−1
BA 1.41 2.11e−1 1.63e−1 1.36e−2 1.11e−1 7.396e−3 1.55 3.31
TABLE 4. Adversarial attacks perturbation statistics in the `∞ norm. We report the mean
and variance of the adversarial attack distance for each method on a subsample of the test
dataset. Lower values are better.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet-1KAllCNN ResNeXt34
µ σ2 µ σ2 µ σ2 µ σ2
LogBarrier 1.57e−1 7.43e−3 6.16e−3 1.3e−5 5.14e−3 3.20e−5 1.27e−2 1.46e−3
IFGSM 2.49e−1 3.4e−2 1.14e−2 6.93e−4 2.70e−2 2.07e−3 2.38e−3 1.30e−5
Original
LogBarrier
IFGSM
(A) `∞ attacks on MNIST
Original
LogBarrier
IFGSM
(B) `∞ attacks on CIFAR10
FIGURE 3. Adversarial images for `∞ perturbations, generated by the LogBarrier and
IFGSM adversarial attacks, compared against the original clean image. Where IFGSM
has difficulties finding adversarial images, the LogBarrier method succeeds: LogBarrier
adversarial images are visibly less distorted than IFGSM adversarial images.
We also report the mean and variance of the adversarial attack distances, measured in `2 and `∞, in Tables
3 and 4 respectively. A strong adversarial attack should have a small mean adversarial distance, and a small
variance. Small variance is necessary to ensure precision of the attack method. A strong attack method
should be able to consistently find close adversarial examples. Table 3 demonstrates that, measured in `2, the
LogBarrier attack is either the first ranked attack, or a close second. When measured in `∞, the LogBarrier
attack significantly outperforms IFGSM on all datasets and models, except ImageNet-1K.
For illustration, we show examples of adversarial images from the IFGSM and LogBarrier attacks in
Figure 3. On images where IFGSM requires a large distance to adversarially perturb, the LogBarrier attack
produces visibly less distorted images.
4.2. Defended networks. In this section we turn to attacking adversarially defended networks. We first con-
sider two defence strategies: gradient obfuscation [ACW18], and multi-step adversarial training as described
in Madry et al [MMS+17]. We study these two strategies on the MNIST and ResNeXt34 networks used in
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FIGURE 4. Overlay of attack curves, measured in `∞, on (a) MNIST and (b) CIFAR10
networks. Two types of networks are compared: an undefended network, and a defended
network (denoted (D)), trained using the same architecture as the undefended network with
adversarial training. The LogBarrier attack requires a smaller adversarial distance to attack
all images, compared to IFGSM.
TABLE 5. Defence strategies on MNIST. We report the percentage misclassified at `∞ ad-
versarial magnitudes ‖δ‖∞ = 0.1 and 0.3; higher is better. We also report the attack mag-
nitude needed to perturb 90% of the images (the 90% quantile of attacks, written q(90%)).
’NA’ indicates that the attack failed.
Undefended Obfuscated (T = 2) Adversarial training
‖δ‖∞ = 0.1 ‖δ‖∞ = 0.3 q(90%) ‖δ‖∞ = 0.1 ‖δ‖∞ = 0.3 q(90%) ‖δ‖∞ = 0.1 ‖δ‖∞ = 0.3 q(90%)
LogBarrier 15.70 94.80 2.27e−1 18.30 99.80 1.95e−1 2.90 95.40 2.85e−1
IFGSM 12.40 62.5 4.60e−1 8.60 32.90 NA 3.00 53.80 6.51e−1
Section 4.1. We limit ourselves to studying defence methods for attacks in the `∞ norm. Attacks are per-
formed on the same 1000 randomly selected images as the previous section. Finally, we also test our attack
on a MNIST model trained with Convex Adversarial Polytope [WK18] training, the current state-of-the-art
defence method on MNIST.
Gradient Obfuscation. Although discredited as a defence method [ACW18], gradient obfuscation is a hurdle
any newly proposed adversarial attack method must be able to surmount. We implement gradient obfuscation
by increasing the temperature on the softmax function computing model probabilities from model logits.
As the softmax temperature increases, the size of the gradients of the model probabilities approaches zero,
because the model probabilities approach one-hot vectors. Although the decision boundary of the model does
not change, many adversarial attack algorithms have difficulty generating adversarial examples when model
gradients are small.
In Tables 5 and 6 we show that the LogBarrier attack easily overcomes gradient obfuscation, on both CI-
FAR10 and MNIST models. The reason that the LogBarrier method is able to overcome gradient obfuscation
is simple: away from the decision boundary, the logarithmic barrier term is not active (indeed, it is nearly
zero). Thus the LogBarrier algorithm focuses on minimizing the adversarial distance, until it is very close
to the decision boundary, at which point the barrier term activates. In contrast, because IFGSM is a local
method, if model gradients are small, it has a difficult time climbing the loss landscape, and is not able to
generate adversarial images.
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TABLE 6. Defence strategies on ResNeXt34 on the CIFAR10 dataset. We report the per-
centage misclassified at `∞ adversarial magnitudes of ‖δ‖∞ = 4/255 and 8/255, and the
magnitude required to perturb 90% of test images. If the adversarial attack was unsuccess-
ful, we report NA.
Undefended Obfuscated (T = 20) Adversarial training
‖δ‖∞ = 4255 ‖δ‖∞ = 8255 q(90%) ‖δ‖∞ = 4255 ‖δ‖∞ = 8255 q(90%) ‖δ‖∞ = 4255 ‖δ‖∞ = 8255 q(90%)
LogBarrier 98.40 98.70 7.79e−3 47.60 54.40 1.53e−1 23.40 48.10 9.58e−2
IFGSM 58.30 75.80 6.56e−2 36.90 43.90 NA 31.60 54.90 1.38e−1
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training is a popular method for defending against adversarial attacks.
We test the LogBarrier attack on networks trained with multi-step adversarial training in the `∞ norm, as
presented in Madry et al [MMS+17]. Our results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. We also plot defence curves of
the LogBarrier and IFGSM attacks on defended and undefended models in Figures 4a and 4b, for respectively
MNIST and CIFAR10.
On MNIST, we did not observe a reduction in test accuracy on clean images with adversarially trained
models compared to undefended models. As expected, adversarial training hinders both LogBarrier and
IFGSM from finding adversarial images at very small distances. However, we see that the LogBarrier attack
is able to attack all images with nearly the same distance in both the defended and undefended models. In
contrast, IFGSM requires a very large adversarial distance to attack all images on the defended model, as
shown in Figure 4a. That is, adversarial training does not significantly reduce the empirical distance required
to perturb all images, when the LogBarrier attack is used. The point is illustrated in Table 5, where we report
the distance required to perturb 90% of all images. The LogBarrier attack requires an adversarial distance
of 0.22 on the undefended MNIST model, and 0.29 on the defended MNIST model, to perturb 90% of all
images. In contrast, IFGSM requires a distance of 0.46 on the undefended model, but 0.65 on the defended
model.
On CIFAR10, we observe the same behaviour, although the phenomenon is less pronounced. As shown in
Table 6 and Figure 4b, the LogBarrier attack requires a smaller adversarial distance to perturb all images than
IFGSM. Notably, the LogBarrier attack on the defended network is able to attack all images with a smaller
adversarial distance than even IFGSM on the undefended network.
Against the Convex Adversarial Polytope. Finally, we use the LogBarrier attack on a provable defence strat-
egy, the Convex Adversarial Polytope [WK18]. The Convex Adversarial Polytope is a method for training a
model to guarantee that no more than a certain percentage of images may be attacked at a given adversarial
distance. We chose to attack the defended MNIST network in [WK18], which is guaranteed to have no more
than 5.82% misclassification at perturbation size ‖δ‖∞ = 0.1. We validated this theoretical guarantee with
both the LogBarrier attack and IFGSM, and found that both methods were unable to perturb more than 3%
of test images at distance 0.1.
5. DISCUSSION
We have presented a new adversarial attack that uses a traditional method from the optimization literature,
namely the logarithmic barrier method. The LogBarrier attack is effective in both the `∞ and `2 norms.
The LogBarrier attack directly solves the optimization problem posed by the very definition of adversarial
images; i.e., find an image close to an original image, while being misclassified by a network. This is in
contrast to many other adversarial attack problems (such as PGD or IFGSM), which attempt to maximize
a loss function as a proxy to the true adversarial optimization problem. Whereas loss-based adversarial
attacks start locally at or near the original image, the LogBarrier attack begins far from the original image.
In this sense, the LogBarrier attack is similar in spirit to the Boundary attack [BRB18]: both the LogBarrier
attack and the Boundary attack begin with a misclassified image, and iteratively move the image closer to
the original image, while maintaining misclassification. The LogBarrier attack is a gradient-based attack: to
enforce misclassification, gradients of the logarithmic barrier are required. In contrast, the Boundary attack
is gradient-free, and uses rejection sampling to enforce misclassification. Although the LogBarrier attack
THE LOGBARRIER ADVERSARIAL ATTACK 11
uses gradients, we have shown that it is not impeded by gradient obfuscation, a common drawback to other
gradient-based attacks. Because the LogBarrier attack is able to use gradients, it is typically faster than the
Boundary attack.
The LogBarrier attack may be used as an effective tool to validate claims of adversarial robustness. We
have shown that one strength of the LogBarrier attack is its ability to attack all images in a test set, using a
fairly small maximum adversarial distance compared to other attacks. In other words, the LogBarrier attack
estimates the mean adversarial distance with high precision. Using the LogBarrier attack, we have raised
questions about the robustness of multi-step adversarial training [MMS+17]. For instance, on MNIST, we
showed that multi-step adversarial training did not significantly improve the necessary distance required to
perturb all test images, relative to an undefended model. For adversarially trained models on CIFAR10,
we showed that the necessary distance to perturb all images is significantly smaller than the estimate pro-
vided by IFGSM. This is further motivation for the development of rigorous, theoretical guarantees of model
robustness.
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